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Abstract—The modernization of the electrical grid and the in-
stallation of smart meters come with many advantages to control
and monitoring. However, in the wrong hands, the data might
pose a privacy threat. In this paper, we consider the tradeoff
between smart grid operations and the privacy of consumers. We
analyze the tradeoff between smart grid operations and how often
data is collected by considering a realistic direct-load control
example using thermostatically controlled loads, and we give
simulation results to show how its performance degrades as the
sampling frequency decreases. Additionally, we introduce a new
privacy metric, which we call inferential privacy. This privacy
metric assumes a strong adversary model, and provides an upper
bound on the adversary’s ability to infer a private parameter,
independent of the algorithm he uses. Combining these two
results allow us to directly consider the tradeoff between better
load control and consumer privacy.
Index Terms—privacy, smart grid, direct load control, cyber-
physical systems
I. INTRODUCTION
DATA collected by the smart grid enables a multitudeof advantages to all parties, including better efficiency
in energy distribution, more reliability, and transparency to
electric utility customers in their energy consumption. Smart
grid data, however, also raises the issue of data privacy. Energy
usage data is collected at larger scales and at unprecedented
levels of granularity. Monitoring energy consumption at high
granularity can allow the inference of detailed information
about consumers’ lives. This includes the times they eat, when
they watch TV, and when they take a shower [1]. Such infor-
mation is highly valuable and will be sought by many parties,
including advertising companies [2], law enforcement [3], and
criminals [4].
In response to these concerns, governments, researchers, and
organizations are working on privacy standards and policies
to guide advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) deployments.
Researchers have considered the issue of data privacy in smart
grid infrastructures, and have proposed novel mechanisms for
protecting the collected data (encryption, access control, and
cryptographic commitments) [5], [6], by anonymization and
aggregation [7], [8], and by preventing inferences and re-
identification from databases that allow queries from untrusted
third parties (via differential privacy) [9].
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While all these previous proposals have strong contribu-
tions, none of them has addressed the Fair Information Practice
(FIP) principle of data minimization. The NISTIR 7628 [10]
expresses the data minimization principle in the smart grid
context as:
Limit the collection of data to only that necessary
for Smart Grid operations, including planning and
management, improving energy use and efficiency,
account management, and billing.
This same principle is included in several smart grid privacy
recommendations including those published by the North
American Energy Standards Board [11], DOE [12], the Texas
Legislature and Public Utility Commission [13], and the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) [14].
Electric utilities who want to follow these privacy recom-
mendations do not have a sound reasoning principle to help
them decide how much data is too little or too much. Our
goal in this paper is to start discussing scientifically sound
principles that can help determine how much data to collect
in order to achieve a certain level of functionality of the grid,
and how much privacy is granted to consumers under this data
collection policy.
To successfully understand the utility-privacy tradeoff in
these smart grid operations, we must quantify two things.
First, we must model the tradeoff between how often data is
collected and performance of smart grid operations. Second,
we must understand the tradeoff between how much data is
collected and the inference an adversary can make about a
consumer’s private information.
In this paper, our goal is to analyze these tradeoffs in
the context of electricity load shaping (demand response).
To quantify how much data is needed for smart grid oper-
ations, we consider how the performance of proposed direct
load control (DLC) mechanisms change as fewer and fewer
measurements are received by the controller. To quantify the
privacy risk in these mechanisms, we use recent results in
nonintrusive load monitoring (NILM) to give guarantees on
when NILM algorithms will not be able to infer the device
usage of a consumer from observing the aggregate power
consumption of a building, acting as a certificate of privacy
for the consumer.
This paper extends ideas presented in our previous
work [15], where we used model predictive control (MPC)
methods on a highly stylized DLC model to reduce unexpected
demand across time, and analyzed the likelihood of the de-
mand exceeding certain bounds as a function of the sampling
rate. In contrast, in this paper we consider a more realistic DLC
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2model and provide a formal definition of privacy that allows
us to quantify the privacy of different sampling policies.
We note that our work is complementary to other privacy
policies being researched. Our analysis helps determine how
much data to collect and how often it should be collected. Once
this is in place, encryption, anonymization and aggregation
techniques can be employed in tandem.
The closest previous work to the ideas in this paper is the
work of Sankar, Kar, Tandon, and Poor [16], which considers
the utility and privacy tradeoffs from smart grid data. Their
approach, however, focuses on the quality of collected data (by
using quantization, and coding theory); while in this paper we
focus on the quantity of collected data (or more precisely,
the sampling interval). To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper considering a concrete model of smart grid
operations and the tradeoff between its performance and the
privacy of its consumers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we outline a DLC model studied in recent literature and con-
sider how different sampling policies affect its performance. In
Section III, we define our metric for privacy, called inferential
privacy, inspired by the recent literature in NILM. Inferential
privacy provides a strong adversary model, and give guarantees
on when this adversary can infer private information about the
consumer. In this paper, we are interested in which private
information, seemingly unrelated to DLC, can be inferred
from the data collected by AMIs. Finally, in Section IV, we
conclude and discuss directions for future work.
II. DIRECT LOAD CONTROL PERFORMANCE
In this section, we consider the effects of lower sampling
rates on smart grid operations. In particular, we focus on
a direct load control (DLC) application using thermostati-
cally controlled loads (TCLs) to manage load imbalances. As
mentioned in Section I, for this paper, we restrict our scope
to consider data sampling policies. Other ways to alter the
privacy of a consumer participating in an advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) include adding noise to data, modifying
how data is aggregated, and the duration of data retention.
Such investigations are outside the scope of this paper, but are
an active topic of research [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [16], [17].
DLC has been a promising future direction for the smart
grid for a variety of reasons. By controlling loads which can
be modified without much impact on consumer satisfaction,
we can allay many costs by shifting loads from peak demand
and compensating for real-time load imbalances. Additionally,
as renewable energy penetration increases, the generation side
of power is growing more uncertain and will require demand
flexibility.
TCLs, which are often heating, ventilation, and air condi-
tioning (HVAC) systems for buildings, are a promising avenue
for the implementation of DLC policies [18], [19]. This is
due to the fact that buildings have a thermal inertia and can,
in essence, store energy. Power consumption can be deferred
and shifted while resulting in an imperceptible change in
temperature.
Additionally, such DLC policies are being deployed today.
For example, Pacific Gas & Electric deployed the SmartAC
program in Spring 2007 [20]. Another provider of demand
response (DR) services has recruited over 1.25 million res-
idential customers in DLC programs, and has deployed over
5 million DLC devices in the United States. In California, they
have successfully curtailed over 25 MW of power consumption
since 2007 [21]. As these programs are being deployed on a
large scale, it is important to consider the privacy aspects of
these programs.
In this paper, we consider one recently proposed DLC
program for concreteness. We note that our contribution is a
general framework for numerically analyzing the sensitivity of
these DLC programs to different information collection poli-
cies. We consider this research to be complementary to other
research in how parameters affect system performance [22],
[23].
Additionally, our development focuses on air conditioning
for notational simplicity, but similar statements can be made
for heaters.
A. Thermostatically controlled load model
The model outlined in this section closely mirrors the model
presented in [24]. There are other TCL and DLC models in
the literature, e.g. [25], [26], and our analysis can similarly be
applied to these models as well.
Let I denote the set of TCLs participating in a DLC
program. We model each TCL i ∈ I as a discrete-time
difference equation:
θi(k+1) = aiθi(k)+(1−ai)[θa,i(k)−mi(k)θg,i]+i(k) (1)
In the above equations, θi(k) is the internal temperature of
TCL i at time k, θa,i is the ambient temperature around TCL
i, mi is the control signal of TCL i, and i is a noise process.
The term ai = exp(−h/(RiCi)), where h is the sampling
period, Ri is the thermal resistance of TCL i, and Ci is the
thermal capacitance of TCL i. The θg term is the temperature
gain when a TCL is in the ON state, and θg = RiPtrans,i, where
Ptrans,i is the energy transfer rate of TCL i. Let Pi denote the
power consumed by TCL i when it is in the ON state.
The local control for TCL i is modeled by the variable
mi. We assume the local controller does a basic ON/OFF
hysteresis control based on its setpoint and deadband. For a
cooling TCL, this is defined as:
mi(k + 1) =

0 if θi(k + 1) < θset,i − δi/2
1 if θi(k + 1) > θset,i + δi/2
mi(k) otherwise
(2)
In these equations, θset,i and δi are the temperature setpoint
and deadband of TCL i, respectively. If mi(k) = 1, then we
say that TCL i is in the ON state at time k, and similarly
mi(k) = 0 means that i is in the OFF state at k.
B. Direct load control objective
We consider DLC policies that attempt to compensate for
load imbalances and defer demands from peak times by
switching TCLs between the ON state and the OFF state. The
marginal cost of peak loads and unexpected load imbalances is
3responsible for a large portion of the preventable costs in the
electricity grid; for a more detailed treatment of the benefits
and impact of a DLC policy which can shave demand, we
refer the reader to [27].
Formally, we consider the load imbalance as an exogenous
variable. In particular, the centralized DLC operator is given
some desired power trajectory Pdes for the TCLs. The goal
of the operator is to minimize the root-mean-square (RMS)
error between the actual power consumed by the TCLs and the
signal Pdes, i.e. it wishes to minimize
∥∥∑
i∈I Pimi − Pdes
∥∥
2
.
C. Direct load control capabilities
To achieve the DLC objective, we assume the DLC operator
has the capability of telling TCLs to switch modes between
ON and OFF. This has the effect of tightening the deadband for
TCLs. More explicitly, if the DLC operator issues a command
to a TCL to switch from OFF to ON, the TCL turns on its
air conditioner earlier than it would have in the absence of a
control command, which is essentially lowering the ceiling of
the deadband.
Note that this control policy maintains customer satisfaction
in the sense that the thermal variation inside the TCL will not
increase as a result of this control policy. However, the control
commands may cause TCLs to switch more frequently, which
may have the effect of faster depreciation and degradation
of the TCL; as a heuristic for minimizing this effect, the
controller we consider preferentially issues control commands
to TCLs whose local hysteresis controller is likely to switch
modes soon.
We assume the controller has access to the parameters
(ai, θa,i, θg,i, θset,i, δi, Pi) for each TCL i ∈ I. In other words,
the controller knows the dynamics of each TCL. However, it
is only able to observe the signals (θi(k),mi(k)) for certain
values of k, determined by the privacy-aware sampling policy.
Note here that constant parameters are considered non-
private, whereas temporal information about the state inside
the building is considered private. To understand the degree of
privacy in these sampling policies, we can refer to the privacy
metric introduced in Section III. We also note that situations
may arise where some of these constant parameters are also
private, and would like to consider this case in future work.
D. Direct load controller
In this section, we outline a direct load control policy
inspired by work in the recent literature [18], [24].
Our model of a direct load controller is as follows. First,
the controller maintains an estimate of the thermal state of
each TCL. At time k + 1, the estimator uses the observation
if it is available. If no measurement is available, it evolves the
estimates according to the dynamics with known parameters
α, under the assumption that i(k) = 0.
These estimates are used to issue control commands. Our
controller takes a binning approach, as seen in recent re-
search [18], [24]. Each TCL is assigned to a bin based on
its thermal state relative to its deadband, and whether or not
it is in the ON or OFF state. More formally, let Nbin be an
even number denoting the number of bins our controller uses.
For the ON states, we assign Nbin/2 evenly spaced bins, and
similarly for the OFF states.
Based on its estimate of how many TCLs are in each bin, the
controller issues a command to each bin, stating what fraction
of the TCLs in each bin should switch states. More concretely,
the controller switches TCLs at time k based on the mismatch
between the estimated power consumed
∑
i∈I Pimˆi(k) at time
k and the desired power consumption Pdes(k) at time k.
At the level of an individual TCL, the TCL can calculate
which bin it is in, based on its true state (θi(k),mi(k))
and its deadband. When a TCL receives a command c, it
will switch states with probability c. Using a probability
allows the centralized controller to issue commands without
broadcasting individual TCL identities, and without explicit
knowledge of which TCLs will switch. Additionally, a TCL
can decide whether or not to switch entirely on its own,
without coordination or communication with other members
of its bin.
E. Direct load control simulations
We summarize how simulations were generated for the
framework just outlined. For this simulation, we assume each
TCL consumes Pi = 2.5 kW when on, and we consider a
DLC operator in control of 1000 TCLs. Parameters for each
TCL i are drawn independently, from distributions based on
recent studies of a 250 m2 home [24], [18]. The time step
h was chosen to be h = 1 minute, and the number of bins
Nbin = 10.
The ambient temperature θa = 32◦C for all TCLs1, and the
noise process i(k) is independent across k and distributed
according to a N(0, 0.0005) distribution for each k.
In normal operation, assuming the uniform distribution
across the deadband and the Bernoulli distribution across
ON/OFF states, the expected number of TCLs in the ON state
is 1000/2 = 500. Since each device consumes 2.5 kW when
on, that means the expected power consumption at any time
k is 500 · 2.5 kW = 1.25 MW.
California Independent System Operator (CAISO) market
signals are given in 5 minute intervals [24], [28], so for
simulations, the signal Pdes is independently drawn from
a U(1.25 MW · 0.7, 1.25 MW · 1.05) distribution2. That is,
Pdes(k) is uniformly drawn for k ∈ {0, 5, 10, . . . }. For other
values of k, we take the linear interpolation.
One simulation of the aggregate power consumption of all
the TCLs is shown in Figure 1. Comparing the top plot with
the middle and bottom plots, we can see that a DLC policy
can reduce the load imbalance even when the controller does
not always receive measurements. However, small unforeseen
temperature deviations can cause the controller’s performance
to degrade if enough measurements are not provided, as seen
by comparing the middle and bottom plots.
Additionally, the thermal state of one TCL is shown in Fig-
ure 2 for the uncontrolled case, the case where h = 1 minute,
1For these simulations, we assumed that the ambient temperature is constant
for the time window under consideration.
2These values were chosen as reasonable values for which energy consump-
tion could be compensated. From simulations, we find that a larger interval
is more difficult to track, as expected.
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Fig. 1. A sample simulation of the aggregate power consumption of 1000
TCLs. The solid blue line represents the actual power consumption, and the
dotted red line represents the desired power consumption. The top figure
shows the power consumption in the absence of any control commands, the
middle figure shows the power consumption with a sampling period of h =
1 minute, and the bottom figure shows the power consumption with a sampling
period of h = 30 minutes.
and the case where h = 30 minutes. We can see that the
temperature inside the TCL remains inside the deadband,
resulting in no loss of comfort to the consumer, in all three
cases.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
22.4
22.6
22.8
23.0
23.2
23.4
23.6
thermal state (uncontrolled)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
22.4
22.6
22.8
23.0
23.2
23.4
23.6
te
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
 (
d
e
g
 C
)
thermal state (h = 1 min)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
time (min)
22.4
22.6
22.8
23.0
23.2
23.4
23.6
thermal state (h = 30 min)
Fig. 2. The thermal state of one sample TCL. The top graph shows the
thermal states of the TCL when there is no control. The middle and bottom
graphs show the thermal states based on a controller that receives observations
every h = 1 minute and h = 30 minutes, respectively. The dotted red lines
indicate the deadband limits. The diamonds indicate when the DLC policy
issued control commands to the TCL.
In Figure 3, we plot the error between the actual power
consumption and the desired load imbalance compensation
signal. First, we randomly drew a Pdes signal and TCL pa-
rameters. Then, for this fixed Pdes signal and TCL parameters,
we ran 500 trials for each sampling period h, and we consider
the empirical distribution of the difference between the actual
power consumed by all the TCLs and the desired power signal:∑
i∈I Pimi − Pdes. We used the `1 norm on the error signal,
so, if we assume a fixed price for spot market electricity
purchases/sales throughout the hour interval, this is directly
proportional to the cost the utility company must pay.
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Fig. 3. A plot of how the error between the actual power consumed by the
TCLs and the desired power consumption signal empirically varies with the
sampling period h. The value we are plotting is ‖∑i∈I Pimi−Pdes‖1. The
whiskers indicate all data points within 1.5 IQR. For reference, the error after
500 simulations of uncontrolled TCLs has an empirical mean of 5.39 MW
with a standard error of 302 kW.
III. INFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In Section II, we consider how a larger sampling period
affects the performance of a DLC program. Whereas it is
intuitive that receiving fewer samples will increase a con-
sumer’s privacy, we can leverage results from nonintrusive
load monitoring (NILM) to give guarantees of privacy to a
user. In this section, we introduce our metric for privacy, called
inferential privacy.
Data is collected from consumers with the intent of improv-
ing the efficiency of the smart grid. However, this data also
contains information that does not assist in the operation of
direct load control programs. This section quantifies how much
information about the private lives of consumers is contained
in data which is, in a sense, orthogonal to the information
needed by the controller discussed in Section II.
A. A generative model of energy consumption
First, we present a generative model for a user’s energy
consumption patterns. We note that the aggregate power
consumption signal is not private in and of itself; rather, it
is the information about the consumer that can be inferred
from this signal. Thus, suppose we have some private variable
θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is some finite set. For example, θ could be a
binary variable representing whether or not a user is home, or
whether or not a high-power grow lamp is being used inside
the building. We assume that for one fixed consumer, their
type follows some multinomial distribution pθ, i.e. θ ∼ pθ.
5Given the consumer’s private variable, a consumer will have
a particular lifestyle, which will lead to different likelihoods
of different device usage patterns. For example, a disengaged
energy waster will likely leave her HVAC unit operating
when she leaves her residence, whereas a green-advocate will
likely turn her HVAC off whenever no one is present in her
household. Thus, our model supposes a probability distribution
a set of usage parameters, denoted by u ∈ U , which is
conditionally dependent on a user’s type θ. Note here that
we do not assume U is finite. More formally, in our model we
have u | θ ∼ pu|θ(· | θ), where pu|θ(· | θ) denotes the density
of the distribution of these usage parameters conditioned on
the consumer’s private variable θ.
Finally, devices consume power based on how they are used.
Given how a device is being used, its power consumption
is independent of the consumer’s private variable. Formally,
this means that the power consumption y ∈ Y is based
on the device usage, and is conditionally independent of
the consumer’s private variable given the device usage, i.e.
y | u, θ ∼ py|u(· | u) where py|u(· | u) is the density of
a probability distribution that models the devices inside the
household. For example, in [29], [30], py|u(· | u) is the density
of the output of a linear system with additive Gaussian noise.
Additionally, note that Y is not a finite set, and is usually taken
to be RT , where T is the number of data samples collected.
To recap, our model for energy consumption in a household
is a hierarchical Bayesian model where the customer’s private
variable is drawn according to some prior, the customer’s
device usage patterns is drawn from a distribution based on
the customer’s type, and the energy consumption of a customer
is drawn from a distribution based on how devices are being
used.
Assumption 1. The consumer’s private variable, device us-
age, and energy consumption are distributed according to the
following hierarchical Bayes model:
θ ∼ pθ (3)
u | θ ∼ pu|θ(· | θ) (4)
y | u, θ ∼ py|u(· | u) (5)
Here, θ takes values in a finite set Θ. Additionally, let py|θ(y |
θ) =
∫
py|u(y | u)pu|θ(u | θ)du denote the density of y | θ.
B. Connections to differential privacy
Recently, differential privacy has been a popular metric
for measuring the privacy of users in a system [31], [32].
Differential privacy is a very attractive theoretical notion, as
it is a broad definition which abstracts away the problem of
defining an adversary model or privacy breach to provide a
privacy guarantee independent of the adversary or definition
of a privacy breach.
However, the concept of differential privacy often relies on
additive noise of some form to give the privacy guarantees.
In electrical grid applications, there are many cases where
the original raw data is required, for practical, regulatory,
performance, or economic reasons. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no straightforward way to apply concepts of
differential privacy to different sampling policies.
In contrast to differential privacy, our privacy metric can
be used passively, i.e. without adding noise to the observed
signal. It exploits the uncertainty intrinsic to device models
and human behavior, i.e. the distributions on θ, u, and y. We
also specify the definition of a privacy breach, i.e. an adversary
correctly inferring a private parameter θ. Our definition is
closer to the concept of equivocation metrics, e.g. [17], than
differential privacy.
C. Inferential privacy
We suppose that a consumer’s type θ is sensitive informa-
tion: we wish to measure how much about θ is disclosed from
y, the data transmitted by an AMI. Note that, if there are a
finite number of ways to use devices in the household, i.e. U is
finite, device usage can be considered the sensitive information
as a special case, by taking θ ≡ u.
We note here that the problem of inferring u from y is a
growing topic of research, known either as nonintrusive load
monitoring or energy disaggregation [33], [34], [35], [36],
[30]. People are actively working on recovering device usage
information from an aggregate power consumption signal, and
the privacy issue of inferring consumption patterns from AMI
signals is a real threat.
Now, we introduce our adversary model.
Assumption 2. Our adversary is able to observe the AMI
signal y, and has knowledge of pθ, pu|θ, and py|u. Additionally,
this adversary has an arbitrary amount of computational
power.
This adversary has access to the measured data signal, and
also holds priors on the consumer’s private information θ.
He also knows how different consumer types use devices,
pu|θ, and also has access to models of the device’s power
consumption py|u. Although this adversary has quite a bit of
knowledge about the consumers, he does not hold arbitrary
side information.
Our privacy metric is the probability of error if an adversary
tries to infer the private variable θ.
Definition 1. Under the hierarchical Bayes model outlined in
Assumption 1, an AMI protocol is ‘α inferentially private’ if,
for any estimator θ̂ : Y → Θ, we have Pr(θ̂(y) 6= θ) ≥ α.
This estimator can be based on information in pθ, pu|θ, and
py|u.
Here, we note that this privacy metric is spread across Θ
according to pθ. As often arises in many statistical estimation
problems, a privacy metric that guarantees privacy for every
type is not a well-posed problem.
For example, suppose Θ = {0, 1}, and consider the estima-
tor θ̂ ≡ 0. For any consumer of type θ = 0, the adversary will
correctly infer their type with this estimator. In other words,
an adversary can always violate the privacy of one type of
consumer by making the blanket assumption that everyone is
a fixed type. In a sense, we gain privacy by noting that the
adversary has to be successful across the different types Θ
(weighted according to pθ).
Regardless of the algorithm the adversary uses, we can
bound the probability it will successfully breach a consumer’s
6privacy. Furthermore, this formula allows us to vary different
parameters of the AMI, such as how often data is collected
and transmitted. We will examine this on a concrete example
in Section III-E. This guarantee is also simple for consumers
to interpret, and can be used in the design of privacy contracts
between the utility company and electricity consumers [37].
We note that it may not be realistic to suppose the adversary
has access to this information. However, any adversary who
tries to infer θ from y with less information will only do
worse than our adversary model. Thus, this model provides
a conservative estimate against all weaker adversary models.
D. Theory
In this section, we will derive results that allow us to
calculate values of α that satisfy the condition given in
Definition 1. This section is an extension of our work [38].
There are three methods by which we can derive lower
bounds. Depending on the particular form of pθ, pu|θ, and
py|u, some forms of the lower bound may be easier to calculate
than others.
1) Likelihood-based methods: Let Θ = {1, . . . r}. We can
define the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimator θ̂MAP ,
which maximizes Pr(θ̂(y) = θ).
Proposition 1. [39], [38] Under the hierarchical Bayes model
outlined in Assumption 1, Pr(θ̂(y) = θ) is maximized by:
θ̂MAP (y) = arg max
i
(pi(i) · py|θ(y|i)) (6)
The optimality of the MAP estimator with respect to the
prior pi immediately leads to a guarantee of privacy.
Proposition 2. [38] Under the hierarchical Bayes model
outlined in Assumption 1, the AMI protocol is α inferentially
private, where α = Pr(θ̂MAP (y) 6= θ). Furthermore, the AMI
protocol is not α′ inferentially private for any α′ > α.
Although this bound is optimal, it is often difficult to
calculate. In these instances, some of the latter bounds may
be used as a surrogate.
2) Le Cam’s method: We present Le Cam’s lemma in
the context of our energy consumption model. Again, let
Θ = {1, 2, . . . , r}. First, we offer two definitions of distances
between probability distributions.
Definition 2. The total variation distance between two densi-
ties p and q on a measure space (X,A, µ) is given by:
‖p− q‖TV = sup
A∈A
∣∣∣∣∫
A
p(x)− q(x)µ(dx)
∣∣∣∣ = (7)
1
2
∫
X
|p(x)− q(x)|µ(dx) (8)
Definition 3. The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between
two densities p and q on a measure space (X,A, µ) is given
by:
DKL(p‖q) =
∫
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
µ(dx) (9)
Similarly, we will define the KL divergence between two
random variables X and Y to be the KL divergence between
their densities, and it will be denoted DKL(X‖Y ).
Now, we can state Le Cam’s lemma.
Proposition 3. [40], [41] Assume the hierarchical Bayes
model outlined in Assumption 1. Then, for any estimator
θ̂ : Y → Θ and any distinct i, j ∈ Θ, we have:
Pr(θ̂(y) 6= θ | θ = i) + Pr(θ̂(y) 6= θ | θ = j) ≥ (10)
1− ‖py|θ(·|i)− py|θ(·|j)‖TV (11)
A quick corollary is a lower bound on the probability of
error:
Proposition 4. Under the assumptions of Proposition 6,
Pr(θ̂ 6= θ) is bounded below by:
min(pi(i), pi(j)) · (1− ‖py|θ(·|i)− py|θ(·|j)‖TV ) (12)
In practice, it will suffice to find an over-approximation of
the total variation distance. For example, we have Pinsker’s
inequality:
Proposition 5. [42] For any densities p and q:
‖p− q‖TV ≤
√
1
2
DKL(p‖q) (13)
Thus, we can provide a guarantee of inferential privacy.
Proposition 6. Under the hierarchical Bayes model outlined
in Assumption 1, the AMI protocol is α inferentially private,
where:
α = max
i 6=j
[
min(pi(i), pi(j)) · (1− ‖py|θ(·|i)− py|θ(·|j)‖TV )
]
(14)
3) Fano’s method: Here we will state Fano’s inequality in
the context of our energy consumption model, where Θ =
{1, . . . , r}.
Proposition 7. [41] In the model of Assumption 1, for any
estimator θ̂ : Y → Θ, the probability of error P (θ̂(y) 6= θ) is
bounded below by:
1
log(r − 1)
log r − 1
r2
∑
i,j
DKL
[
py|θ(·|i)
∥∥py|θ(·|j)]− log 2

(15)
Thus, we have the quick corollary:
Proposition 8. Under the hierarchical Bayes model outlined
in Assumption 1, the AMI protocol is α inferentially private,
where α is given by Equation 15.
E. Privacy metric example
We instantiate our privacy metric on a concrete example
here. Consider the following scenario. Households consider
their income private. However, their income levels will affect
their behaviors at home; in this paper, we focus on how their
cooking behaviors change. To model this, we use data from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2009 Residential
Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) [43]. By observing these
different cooking behaviors through a household’s energy con-
sumption, an adversary may infer the income of the household.
7Formally, let Θ = {θL, θM , θU} denote the private pa-
rameter corresponding to lower (less than $20,000), middle
($20,000 to $59,999), and upper ($60,000 or more) class
incomes. Across 113.6 million U.S. homes, 23.7 million
households are θL, 48.7 million are θM , and 41.2 million are
θU [43]. This will be our prior, pθ.
Furthermore, we look at the overall energy consumption
of each consumer type. This data is shown in Figure 4. For
each type, we fit a log-normal distribution to the overall
energy consumption. To estimate the location parameter µ and
scale parameter σ, we used the unbiased, minimum variance
estimators [44, Chapter 4] on the log of the data3. We assume
the scale parameter is the same for all three private parameters,
and we can see that these distributions approximate the data
quite well.
Thus in this framework, θ determines u, which in this ex-
ample, is µ, the location parameter. In other words, pu|θ has a
trivial distribution for each value of θ. This, in turn, determines
the distribution across the observable energy consumption y,
i.e. py|u(· | u) is the density of a lnN(µ, σ2) distribution.
We assume that power consumption on smaller time scales
is distributed similarly to this annual data, and these distribu-
tions are independent across time.
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Fig. 4. Histograms of the United States household total annual energy
consumptions in each income level in 2009 [43], corresponding to private pa-
rameters θL, θM , and θU . The data roughly follows a log-normal distribution.
The location parameters are µL = 8.88, µM = 9.06, and µH = 9.31, and
we assumed all three distributions had the sample scale parameter, σ = 0.49.
To model sampling, we assume that this data is representative of energy
consumption on smaller time scales as well.
With this assumption, we can consider the distribution of
energy consumption at different sampling rates. Note that, if
we sample at high frequencies, we receive more measurements
than in the low frequency case, but each measurement is less
3Recall that the log-normal distribution, denoted lnN(µ, σ), is defined
by a location parameter µ and scale parameter σ, with density x 7→
1
xσ
√
2pi
exp
(
(ln x−µ)2
2σ2
)
for x > 0.
informative with regards to the consumer’s income level4.
Since the scale parameters are the same for all 3 dis-
tributions, we can explicitly calculate the MAP using the
theory of exponential families [44, Chapter 2]. Then, using
Proposition 2, we can calculate the probability an adversary
can infer the private parameters, i.e. income level, from the
AMI signals. This is represented in Figure 5.
We can see that very high frequency data provides little
guarantees of privacy of income level, but this privacy level,
α, quickly increases as the sampling period h increases. This
is likely due to the fact that the number of measurements used
to calculate the MAP decreases quickly for these values of h.
For example, if h = 1, then 60 samples are used to calculate
the MAP; if h = 10, then only 6 samples are used.
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Fig. 5. A plot of the inferential privacy value α, as a function of the sampling
period h. This is the privacy value for measurements in one hour; we would
expect this to decrease if we sampled for longer durations. Note that our
framework accounts for the fact that with longer sampling periods, we receive
fewer measurements, but each individual measurement is more informative.
Although we focus on a particular example here, this
framework can be applied to more detailed models, i.e. more
informed adversaries, and other private parameters. For exam-
ple, we consider the case where an adversary has knowledge
of correlation across time and high frequency dynamics across
time in [38].
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In an effort to quantify the tradeoff between smart grid
operations and adversarial inferences about consumer behav-
ior, we consider a direct load control of thermostatically
controlled loads, and analyze how its performance degrades
as it receives samples less and less frequently—a privacy
preserving metering policy. We introduce a new privacy metric,
inferential privacy, that exploits the uncertainty intrinsic to
device models and human behavior. Our contribution is a
framework for understanding the utility of data in direct
4Here, we scale the data according to the time scale, and, as before, we
used the uniform, minimum variance estimators on the log of the data [44,
Chapter 4]. For example, if we receive measurements every minute, the
location parameters for each measurement are µL = 0.014, µM = 0.016,
and µH = 0.017, whereas if we receive measurements hourly, the location
parameters are µL = 0.82, µM = 0.99, and µH = 1.26
8load control programs, as well as understanding the private
information about consumers contained in the data.
The introduction of this new privacy metric leads to a
number of interesting open questions. For instance, we could
consider that consumers’ private parameters live on a contin-
uum or are time-varying as is the case in practice. Another
interesting direction is in quantifying the network effects of
privacy. In particular, what information from the crowd to infer
private information from the individual and how does this scale
as the number of users increases? In terms of understanding
the impact on smart grid operations, such privacy metrics
can be used in conjunction with economic tools that capture
individual preferences over energy consumption and privacy
to help balance this utility-privacy tradeoff.
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